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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.  
 
 Today we stop swimming against the tide of opinion 
on an important question of maritime law.  Following the lead 
of several of our sister circuits, we now hold that a union 
contract freely entered by a seafarer – a contract that includes 
rates of maintenance, cure, and unearned wages – will not be 
reviewed piecemeal by courts unless there is evidence of 
3 
 
unfairness in the collective bargaining process.  In so holding, 
we overrule our decision in Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 




 The facts of this case are not in dispute.  James Joyce 
was a member of the Seafarers International Union.  He 
signed “Articles of Agreement” with the shipping company 
Maersk Line Limited and agreed to serve as a bosun aboard 
the MAERSK OHIO for a three-month period, from 
September 18, 2012 until December 18, 2012.  The Union 
and Maersk had reached a collective bargaining agreement 
that governed the terms of all unionized seafarers’ 
employment with Maersk.  The collective bargaining 
agreement was incorporated by reference into the Articles of 
Agreement between Joyce and Maersk.     
 
Not long after the MAERSK OHIO departed as 
scheduled from the Port of Newark, New Jersey, Joyce fell ill.  
He was examined onboard and diagnosed with kidney stones.  
That diagnosis was later confirmed at a hospital in Spain, and 
he was declared unfit for duty and repatriated to the United 
States.   
 
The collective bargaining agreement provided that, if a 
seafarer was medically discharged prior to the conclusion of 
his contract, he was entitled to unearned wages for the 
remaining period of the contract.  Overtime was not included 
in the definition of unearned wages.  Joyce accordingly 
received only base pay as unearned wages for the time left on 




 Dissatisfied, Joyce filed a putative class action in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  
He alleged that the “portions of the [collective bargaining 
agreement] governing unearned wages ... violated general 
maritime law[.]”  Joyce v. Maersk Line, Ltd., No. 13-5566, 
2016 WL 3566726, at *1 (D.N.J. June 30, 2016).  More 
particularly, he claimed that he was owed overtime pay.1  Id. 
at *2.  The District Court disagreed and granted summary 
judgment to Maersk on the ground that, as a matter of law, 
given the collective bargaining agreement, Joyce was not 
entitled to overtime.  Id. at *6-7.  In doing so, the Court 
distinguished our decision in Barnes.  Id.  We had said in that 
case that the specifics of what is covered by a seafarer’s right 
to “maintenance”  – traditionally, the right to food and 
lodging expenses – could be modified by a court, even if 
                                              
1 It may seem odd to assert that overtime pay is owed 
for overtime not worked, but there is precedent for Joyce’s 
assertion that overtime a seafarer expected to work but was 
unable to because of illness or injury is pay that should be 
included in unearned wages.  See Padilla v. Maersk Line, 
Ltd., 721 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that, where 
“much of [a seafarer’s] income was derived from overtime 
compensation,” an injured seafarer could recover overtime as 
unearned wages because he “was entitled to recover in full 
the compensation that he would have earned ‘but for’ his 
injury”); Lamont v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 588, 593 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that where the “apparent custom 
and practice” of seafarers was to work a substantial amount of 
overtime, an injured seafarer was “entitled to recover, in full, 
the compensation that he would have earned but for his 




those specifics were established in a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Barnes, 900 F.2d at 640.   
 
Joyce now asks us to overturn the District Court’s 
ruling on unearned wages.2  Because seafarers were entitled 
at common law to both maintenance and unearned wages, he 
argues that our holding in Barnes should extend to unearned 
wages set by a collective bargaining agreement, making the 
union contract subject to change by court order to conform 
with traditional maritime law.  His appeal presents an 
opportunity for us to reconsider our holding in Barnes.3 
 
II.  Standard of Review  
 
 Because the District Court granted Maersk’s motion 
for summary judgment, we review its determination de novo, 
applying the same standard that it applied.  Shelton v. 
Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 559 (3d Cir. 2015).  A “court shall 
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
                                              
2 Joyce had also brought suit based on the Shipowners’ 
Liability Convention and the daily per diem maintenance rate 
under the collective bargaining agreement.  Although the 
District Court ruled against him on those claims too, he does 
not appeal those rulings here.   
 
3 We thank Professor Martin J. Davies of Tulane 
University Law School for his insightful amicus brief 





56(a).  There are no factual disputes at all in this case.  
Instead, we are faced with a pure question of law: whether, on 
the agreed facts, Maersk was entitled to judgment based on 
the collective bargaining agreement.  Our review is thus 
plenary.  See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 
281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that we exercise plenary 
review over questions of law).  
 
III.  Discussion4 
 
A. Review of Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900  
 F.2d 630 (3d Cir. 1990) 
 
Joyce’s argument relies heavily on our holding in 
Barnes, so we turn to it first.  The question in that case was 
whether a seafarer was bound by the maintenance rate set in a 
collective bargaining agreement between the shipowner and 
the seafarers’ union.  Barnes, 900 F.2d at 631.  We began our 
analysis by recognizing the deeply rooted duty at common 
law for a shipowner to pay a seafarer’s maintenance.  Id. at 
633.  “Maintenance is the living allowance for a seaman 
while he is ashore recovering from injury or illness.”  Id.  It 
derives from medieval maritime laws and has long been 
recognized by American courts.  Id.  The right to “cure,” 
which is payment for “medical expenses incurred in treating 
the seaman’s injury or illness[,]” has the same origin.  Id. 
 
The duty to pay maintenance and cure arose from what 
was viewed as the “peculiarity” of seafarers’ lives.  Id.  
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1333.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
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Justice Story explained the views of society at the time: 
“[seamen] are generally poor and friendless, and acquire 
habits of gross indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence.”  
Id. (quoting Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. 
Me. 1823) (No. 6,047)).  Thus, “[i]f some provision be not 
made for them in sickness at the expense of the ship, they 
must often in foreign ports suffer the accumulated evils of 
disease, and poverty, and sometimes perish from the want of 
suitable nourishment.”  Id. (quoting Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 
483).  By imposing the duty on shipowners to pay for 
maintenance and cure, “the interest of the owner will be 
immediately connected with that of the seamen.”  Id. (quoting 
Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 483).  That arrangement benefitted both 
seafarers and owners – the former had the benefit of someone 
“watch[ing] over their health with vigilance and fidelity,” and 
the latter had employees who were “urge[d] ... to encounter 
hazards in the ship’s service.”  Id. (quoting Harden, 11 F. 
Cas. at 483).   
 
Those duties remain in maritime law.  Indeed, in 
Barnes we observed that, besides being long entrenched in 
maritime law, the responsibility to pay maintenance and cure 
has been “construed liberally” and “consistently expanded” 
by the courts.  Id.  The scope of that responsibility extends 
“beyond injuries sustained on board ship or during working 
hours” and is in force “until the seaman has reached the point 
of maximum cure.”  Id. at 633-34.  The right to maintenance 
and cure exists “regardless of ... fault” by the seafarer.  Id. at 
633.  Only in cases of willful misconduct has a seafarer been 
held to be outside the scope of the right.  Id.  
 
With that background, we directed our attention to the 
central question in Barnes, namely whether a contract that 
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established a maintenance rate was binding on a union 
member.  Id. at 631.  The contract at issue established a rate 
of maintenance of $8 per day.  Id. at 632.  We held that it was 
“inconsistent ... with the traditional doctrine of maintenance” 
to say that the rate in a union contract “is binding on a seaman 
who can show higher daily expenses.”  Id. at 640.  We 
therefore analyzed the $8 per day rate and determined it to be 
inadequate.  See id. at 644 (concluding that the maintenance 
award should include “expenses actually incurred or paid in 
connection with ... permanent lodging,” including “gas and 
electric bills” and “home insurance” but not “automobile 
expenses and toiletries”).    
 
In reaching that conclusion, we acknowledged that we 
were departing from the reasoning of three other United 
States Courts of Appeals – the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
– which had faced the same question but decided the matter 
differently.  Id. at 635.  Those other courts had determined 
that the “contractual rate should be binding so long as the 
collective bargaining process ha[d] been fair and the rate of 
maintenance ha[d] been subject to real negotiation.”  Id. 
(citing Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 949 
(9th Cir. 1986)).  They recognized that federal labor laws did 
not directly preempt maritime law on maintenance, but they 
saw the policy behind national labor laws as sufficiently 
weighty and clear to prevent courts from modifying a 
bargained-for rate of maintenance in a union contract.  Id. 
 
Barnes explicitly rejected that reasoning.5  Although 
we indicated “sympath[y] with an approach that would 
                                              
5 We did agree, however, that the union contract was 
not directly preempted.  See Barnes, 900 F.2d at 637-39. 
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encourage the use and reliability of collective bargaining 
agreements,” we believed it was not well-founded in law.  Id. 
at 640.  We declared that we “kn[e]w of no basis for 
permitting such contracts to override a common law maritime 
right of a seaman that has not been preempted by the labor 
laws.”  Id.  Therefore, we said, “unless Congress determines 
that the circumstances giving rise to the need for maintenance 
have changed and that collective bargaining is now a more 
appropriate way to deal with the issue of the ill or injured 
seaman, the common law remedy must remain in full force.”  
Id. 
 
We placed a caveat on our holding, however, noting 
that unions and shipowners could “agree on what they believe 
is a realistic rate of maintenance with the expectation that the 
parties would voluntarily abide by that rate and thereby avoid 
litigation.”  Id.  Somewhat incongruously, though, we then 
immediately approved the frustration of such expectations by 
saying that the plaintiff in Barnes had “met his common law 
burden of producing evidence ... that the $8 rate was 
insufficient to provide him with food and lodging.”  Id.  
Hence, the bargained-for rate was set aside.  Id.   
 
B. Joyce’s Argument  
 
Joyce argues that Barnes allows us to hold that he is 
entitled to overtime pay in his unearned wages.  His logic 
proceeds in three steps.  First, he says that the seafarer’s right 
to unearned wages dates back almost a thousand years and 
should be treated exactly like the right to maintenance.  
Second, he claims that overtime pay has consistently been a 
part of the common law right to unearned wages.  Third, 
Joyce connects the first two steps to Barnes: an unearned 
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wage rate set in a collective bargaining agreement can be set 
aside when there is evidence that it is insufficient, as was the 
maintenance rate in Barnes.  
 
We do not take issue here with Joyce’s first assertion.  
There is ample evidence that, at common law, seafarers were 
and still are entitled to unearned wages.  See Vaughan v. 
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 535 n.2 (1962) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (collecting cases for the proposition that “[t]he 
earliest codifications of the law of the sea provided for 
medical treatment and wages for mariners injured or falling ill 
in the ship’s service.”); see also Flores v. Carnival Cruise 
Lines, 47 F.3d 1120, 1122 (11th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that 
unearned wages were historically part of the relief sought in 
an action for cure and maintenance).  There is less of an 
historical anchor, though, for the second step in Joyce’s 
argument, that the common law right to unearned wages 
includes overtime.  Nonetheless, that proposition is sound.  
Wage rates for ancient mariners were typically set by contract 
in an agreement then known as the shipping articles, and the 
general rule was that “[t]he stipulation in the shipping articles 
[was] conclusive as to wages[,] and no more [could] be 
recovered on any special promise to pay for severe or extra 
labor or exposure in the course of duty[.]”  1 Theophilus 
Parsons, A Treatise on Maritime Law 447-48 (1859) (footnote 
omitted).  A seafarer’s right to his “full wages,” The R.R. 
Springer, 4 F. 671, 672 (S.D. Ohio 1880), therefore meant 
recovery only of the amount stipulated in the articles.  
Gradually, however, that recovery broadened to encompass 
“the full amount reasonably expected by the parties to be paid 
during the voyage.”  Lamont v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 
588, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).  Modern courts have therefore 
included tips, Flores, 47 F.3d at 1122-25, and accumulated 
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time off, Lipscomb v. Foss Mar. Co., 83 F.3d 1106, 1109-11 
(9th Cir. 1996), as part of the unearned wage remedy under 
general maritime law.  Thus, today, as long as the parties’ 
“reasonable expectation includes ‘overtime,’”  Lamont, 613 
F. Supp. at 593, and such wages are “not speculative,” 
Padilla v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 721 F.3d 77, 82-83 (2d Cir. 
2013), they are recoverable.  See id. at 82 (awarding payment 
for overtime as part of unearned wages for seafarers who fell 
ill because “it was the custom and practice for seafarers ... to 
derive substantial income from overtime compensation and 
that, consequently, such compensation was a common 
expectation of both the seamen and of [the shipowner]”); see 
also Shaw v. Ohio River Co., 526 F.2d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 
1975) (noting that accumulated leave time is a component of 
wages). 
 
There is undeniable wisdom to an approach that looks 
to the expectations of the parties when delimiting the 
unearned wage remedy of a seafarer.  When overtime is a 
“common expectation” and the seafarer’s entitlement to it is 
“essentially undisputed,” Padilla, 721 F.3d at 82, overtime 
can be considered merely “wages the seaman would have 
earned” absent injury, Barnes, 900 F.2d at 634 n.2. 
 
If we were to follow Barnes, then, Joyce would likely 
be correct on the third point of his argument as well; we 
would be hard-pressed to say that courts have no power to 
modify unearned wage rates established by collective 
bargaining agreements.6  But every other circuit court to 
                                              
6 The District Court concluded that Barnes was not 
binding because it viewed that precedent as being cabined to 
maintenance.  See Joyce, 2016 WL 3566726, at *6 (“The 
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address the conflict between collectively bargained-for rights 
and seafarers’ rights at common law has seen the issue 
differently than we did.  Joyce’s claim thus hinges on the 
continuing validity of Barnes.  
 
 C. Reconsidering Barnes 
 
 “It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a 
panel in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent 
panels.”  Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1.  “We adhere strictly to that 
tradition[]” and will only depart “on a rare occasion.”  In re 
Grossman’s Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
Consideration by the entire court en banc is therefore required 
to overrule a prior panel’s precedent, Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1, 
and “[w]e do not overturn our precedents lightly.”  Al-Sharif 
v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 734 F.3d 207, 212 
(3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).  We also recognize, however, that 
“stare decisis ‘is not an inexorable command.’”  Id. (quoting 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). 
 
                                                                                                     
Court agrees with Defendant that Barnes does not govern 
Plaintiff’s claim with respect to unearned wages.”).  That is 
not an unreasonable position, and we agree with Amicus 
Curiae that “the right to unpaid wages is different in some 
respects from the right to maintenance and cure.”  (Amicus 
Curiae Br. at 6.)  We are not persuaded, however, that those 
differences would necessitate limiting Barnes (and our 
holding today) to maintenance.  We therefore think that Joyce 
has the better of that particular argument and that, if we were 




 In general, “we decide cases before us based on our 
own examination of the issue, not on the views of other 
jurisdictions.”  In re Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121.  But, when 
we find that our reasoning has been met by “universal 
disapproval” by other jurisdictions, those contrary views may 
“impel us to consider whether the reasoning applied by our 
colleagues elsewhere is persuasive.”  Id.  That was the case in 
In re Grossman’s, where we reevaluated a test established for 
stays in bankruptcy cases.  Id. at 119-20.  The decision we 
were considering then had been called “one of the most 
criticized and least followed precedents” in the bankruptcy 
realm, id. at 120 (quoting Firearms Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. 
United Capital Ins. Co. (In re Firearms Imp. & Exp. Corp.), 
131 B.R. 1009, 1015 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991)), and had been 
“uniformly” rejected by other courts.  Id. 
 
 Barnes has not been met with the same vocal rejection, 
but, when it was decided, three other courts of appeals had 
already reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the rate 
of maintenance in a freely bargained-for union contract was 
binding on the seafarers who signed it.  Al-Zawkari v. Am. 
Steamship Co., 871 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir. 1989); Macedo v. 
F/V Paul & Michelle, 868 F.2d 519, 522 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 949-50.  As already noted, the Court in 
Barnes recognized those decisions but rejected their 
reasoning.  See Barnes, 900 F.2d at 632 (“[W]e will depart 
from the position of the First, Sixth and Ninth Circuits.”).  In 
the twenty-seven years since, every other circuit to consider 
the question has, in turn, rejected Barnes and adopted the 
majority position.  Ammar v. United States, 342 F.3d 133, 146 
(2d Cir. 2003); Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc., 205 F.3d 
1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000); Baldassaro v. United States, 64 
F.3d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1995).  And three circuits have 
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extended their holdings to cover not just maintenance but also 
unearned wage rates established in collective bargaining 
agreements.  See Padilla, 721 F.3d at 82 (“[W]hile the 
entitlement to unearned wages arises under general maritime 
law, rates for unearned wages may be defined and modified in 
collective bargaining agreements[.]” (citing Ammar, 342 F.3d 
at 146-47)); Cabrera Espinal v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 
Ltd., 253 F.3d 629, 631 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he remedies 
provided for in maritime law [including wages] may be 
altered although not abrogated by collective bargaining 
agreements.” (citing Frederick, 205 F.3d at 1291)); Lipscomb, 
83 F.3d at 1108 (“[T]he method for calculating the amount of 
maintenance, cure, and wages may be determined by the 
collective bargaining process[.]” (citing Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 
949)).  Our opinion in Barnes leaves us standing alone and 
suggests that a reevaluation of that decision is in order.  
 
Barnes rested on the idea that common law protections 
for seafarers arose from the “traditional doctrine[s]” of 
maintenance and cure, and that there was “no basis” in the 
law to allow union contracts “to override [those] common law 
maritime right[s]” when they had not been expressly 
“preempted by the labor laws.”  Barnes, 900 F.2d at 640.  
But, as recognized by the Ninth Circuit, this country’s 
“national labor policy is built on the premise that employees 
can bargain most effectively for improvements in wages, 
hours, and working conditions by pooling their economic 
strength and acting through freely chosen labor 
organizations.”  Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 948.  Those policies 
favor honoring holistic contracts between “labor and 
management ... that will effectively regulate every aspect of 
their ... relationship ... from the most crucial to the most 




We now agree that the “broad labor policies which 
undergird federal labor law, as well as the nature of the 
collective bargaining process, require adherence” to the terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement, including rates 
established for maintenance and unearned wages.  Frederick, 
205 F.3d at 1291.  For that conclusion, we do not rely on the 
doctrine of preemption; rather, we recognize, as have our 
sister circuits, that “the need for judicial intervention to 
protect seamen has been substantially lessened[,]” Ammar, 
342 F.3d at 146, and thus the common law basis for requiring 
courts to disregard the freely negotiated agreements of private 
parties and to refuse to enforce the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement also carries substantially less force, see 
Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 948.  Although maritime remedies 
cannot be abrogated, courts should not “lightly embrace the 
repudiation of contractual obligations enumerated in a 
collective bargaining agreement,” id., and Congress has 
clearly expressed that it is generally the role of private labor 
agreements, not courts, to “regulate all aspects of the 
complicated relationship” between employer and employee, 
id. at 949 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & 
Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960)).  That is not only 
the better outcome for shipping companies, which can plan 
with certainty what their responsibilities will be, but it is also 
better for seafarers, whose collective bargaining strength can 
negotiate more favorable employment terms and conditions.  
We are persuaded that piecemeal judicial review of “one of 
many elements ... over which the parties negotiate” 
discourages that back-and-forth process.  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Put differently, “[t]he adequacy of the maintenance 
[or overtime] rate should not be examined in isolation by the 
court because the determination of its adequacy in relation to 
16 
 
the whole scheme of benefits has already been made by the 
union and the seamen who voted for the contract.”  
Baldassaro, 64 F.3d at 213 (quoting Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 
949); see also Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 949 (“[T]he nature of the 
‘give and take’ process of collective bargaining suggest[s] 
that acceptance of a particular package of benefits should be 
binding on the union members.”).   
 
With our course change today, we remove ourselves 
from “engaging in overt legislation of particular dollar 
figures” in union contracts, and instead “enforce privately 
negotiated contractual rates[.]”  Al-Zawkari, 871 F.2d at 588.  
The majority position we adopt accepts the “modern reality” 
of unionized seafarers who negotiate for comprehensive 
contracts.  Ammar, 342 F.3d at 146.  At the start of this 
century, the Second Circuit recognized that the days when 
wary and “friendless” seafarers needed the protection of the 
common law had largely passed.  Id.  “[T]oday, ‘most seamen 
are union members with a union-negotiated package of 
compensation and benefits of which the right to maintenance 
[and unearned wages] is a small component[.]’”  Id. (quoting 
T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 6-32, at 361 
(2d ed. 1994)); cf. Macedo, 868 F.2d at 522 (recognizing that 
collective bargaining agreements are “highly approved 
generally” and that enforcing their limitations on maintenance 
is “quite different” from enforcing limitations negotiated by 
“an individual seaman”).  Unionization has produced a “well-
organized work force with sophisticated leaders who 
constantly press for better working conditions” and the need 
for judicially fashioned protection has “substantially 
lessened.”  Ammar, 342 F.3d at 146.  Negotiated union 
contracts strike a balance by “encompassing a wide range of 
issues for which some provisions will result in greater 
17 
 
protection ... while others will result in less.”  Cabrera 
Espinal, 253 F.3d at 631 (citing Frederick, 205 F.3d at 1291).  
Enforcing union contracts as written respects the priorities 
that modern seafarers have expressed through arms-length 
and well-informed negotiations.7 
                                              
7 In considering the preemption question in Barnes, we 
recognized the modern reality that seafarers are “neither 
friendless nor improvident.”  900 F.2d at 636.  Yet we 
rejected the idea that collective bargaining agreements could 
replace common law rights.  Our opinion was rooted in the 
understanding that “the Supreme Court has shown no 
inclination to depart from its long-established solicitude for 
seamen.”  Id. at 637.  Just a few months later, however, the 
Supreme Court did place some bounds on that solicitude and 
acknowledged that when Congress “speak[s] directly” to 
maritime remedies, courts are limited in their ability “to 
supplement Congress’ answer” by pointing to the special 
status of seamen.  Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 
31 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 27 
(“We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved 
ones must look primarily to the courts as a source of 
substantive legal protection .... In this era, an admiralty court 
should look primarily to these legislative enactments for 
policy guidance.”).  So, while the Court has since reiterated 
that seafarers remain “wards of admiralty,” Atl. Sounding Co., 
Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 417 (2009), our departure 
from Barnes in favor of enforcement of the labor laws is 
consistent with the pronouncements of the Court as well as 
those of the courts of appeals.  It also reflects an appreciation 
of the problems inherent in deciding piecemeal the terms of 





The scope of our decision today makes the holding in 
Barnes untenable, so that unearned wages and maintenance 
are alike subject to modification by union contracts.  See, e.g., 
Lipscomb, 83 F.3d at 1108 (“[T]he method for calculating the 
amount of maintenance, cure, and wages may be determined 
by the collective bargaining process[.]”).  That is logical 
given the shared common law origins of maintenance, cure, 
and unearned wages.  See Cabrera Espinal, 253 F.3d at 631 
(“General maritime law guarantees seamen: ‘(1) maintenance, 
which is a living allowance; (2) cure, which covers nursing 
and medical expenses; and (3) wages.’” (quoting Herbert R. 
Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court 6 (3d ed. 1979))).8  
Our holding thus overrules Barnes and extends that reversal 
to the case before us.  
 
But we also adopt a backstop protection for seafarers, 
as prescribed by our sister circuits.  Consistent with principles 
of contract law, a seafarer with a basis to allege that an entire 
collective bargaining agreement is, or the process whereby it 
was entered into was, “unfair or inadequate” may bring that 
complaint to court.  Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 949.  The Second 
Circuit implicitly made that point when it upheld a 
maintenance figure set in a union contract where there was no 
allegation “that [the] agreement was not a legitimately 
negotiated agreement, or that [the seafarer’s] interests were 
not adequately represented in the negotiation process, or that 
the agreement as a whole is unfair.”  Ammar, 342 F.3d at 146.  
Other circuit courts have also stressed that protection.  See 
                                              
8 We recognized in Barnes that “[t]he right to unearned 
wages ... has the same historical basis as maintenance and 
cure.”  900 F.2d at 634 n.2.  
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Frederick, 205 F.3d at 1291 (“[A]s in Baldassaro[ v. United 
States] and Gardiner[ v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.], [the 
plaintiff] makes no allegations that the [collective bargaining 
agreement] as a whole is unfair or that the union did not 
adequately represent him.”); Baldassaro, 64 F.3d at 213 (“As 
in Gardiner, there is no allegation in this case that the 
[collective bargaining agreement] as a whole is unfair or that 
this seaman was not adequately represented by the Union.”).  
Joyce has not challenged the negotiation process or the 
contract in its entirety, so that backstop is not at issue here.   
 
We note a significant further limitation on our ruling: 
maintenance, cure, and unearned wages are so deeply rooted 
in common law that, absent congressional action, they cannot 
be completely abrogated by contract.  See, e.g., De Zon v. Am. 
President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 667 (1943) (recognizing 
that “no private agreement is competent to abrogate” the 
shipowner’s duty to pay maintenance and cure); Al-Zawkari, 
871 F.2d at 588 (“While the duty to provide maintenance 
cannot be entirely abrogated, as an implied contractual 
provision, the right to maintenance can be modified and 
defined by contract.”); Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 948 (“Although 
the right to maintenance is presumed to exist because of its 
establishment at common law, its rate may be subject to the 
negotiation process.”).  We would look askance, then, at any 
collective bargaining agreement that purported to eliminate 
those rights.  We need not wrestle with that limitation today, 
however, because we are satisfied that defining unearned 
wages without including overtime was, “in relation to the 
whole scheme of benefits[,]” Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 949, not a 
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complete abrogation of Joyce’s common law right to wages.9  
Cf. Barnes, 900 F.2d at 645 (Lifland, J., dissenting) 
(“Collective bargaining has not abrogated the right when it 
clearly recognizes the right and places a dollar value on [it] ... 
in the context of ... bargaining over wages, hours and other 
terms and conditions of employment which results in a 
myriad of benefits appropriate to the maritime 
environment.”).10 
 
                                              
9 We urge courts who are faced with the question of 
whether a right has been abrogated to consider the agreement 
holistically.  A contract that limits the common law rights to 
maintenance, cure, and unearned wages is most likely to 
withstand scrutiny if it expressly recognizes those rights and 
indicates how the rates have been bargained for in the 
negotiation. 
 
10 We also emphasize that, consistent with our 
reasoning, our holding only applies to unionized seafarers.  
The collective bargaining process is such a benefit to 
unionized seafarers and shipowners that it warrants enforcing 
collective bargaining agreements that modify traditional 
maritime rights of maintenance, cure, and unearned wages.  
This rationale does not apply to modify those traditional 
rights of a non-unionized employee.  The disparate treatment 
of unionized and non-unionized seafarers is not inequitable, 
but cf. Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 951 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) 
(“[U]nion seamen and non-union seamen working for the 
same employer might receive different maintenance rates.”); 
rather, it reflects the different choices of free agents who are 




IV.  Conclusion 
 
It is the rare case in which we overrule our own 
precedent.  But when our Court is in disagreement with every 
other circuit to consider a question, it can be wise to 
reconsider our prior reasoning.  Having done so here, we 
overrule Barnes v. Andover and will enforce the rate of 
unearned wages set forth in the collective bargaining 
agreement between Joyce and Maersk.  Consequently, we 
will affirm.11  
                                              
11 “We may affirm the district court on any ground 
supported by the record.”  Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  
